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Abstract 
The present study builds on the explanatory power of the “doing gender” perspective to 
understand the effects of family economic structure on the family and career satisfaction of 
husbands and wives.  Using data from a two-panel, couple-level survey of full-time employed 
middle-class families in the Northeastern United States, we find that when wives’ earnings 
increase relative to their husbands’, their career satisfaction significantly increases whereas their 
husbands’ is significantly depressed.  In contrast, family economic structure has little effect on 
women’ and men’s level of family satisfaction, although we find a significant reduction in family 
satisfaction among couples who have recently shifted towards a more equal-earner economic 
structure.  Our findings underscore the importance of considering both husbands’ and wives’ 
attitudes towards work and career in understanding how “gender is done” in couples, and in 
addressing the resulting family and work relations and dynamics. Focusing on the disjuncture 
between longstanding gender norms and current employment and earning patterns, we highlight 
the potential impact of these findings for couples, counselors, and organizations.   
Keywords: doing gender, dual-earner couples, families, well being, gender differences, 
relationship satisfaction, job satisfaction, division of labor 
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The Impact of Family Economic Structure on Dual-Earners’ Career and Family Satisfaction 
 Substantial increases in women’s rate of labor force participation over the last several 
decades have been accompanied by major changes in the economic structure of families (Blau, 
Ferber, & Winkler, 2006).  Research by Raley, Mattingly, and Bianchi (2006), using three 
decades of U.S. Current Population Survey data on couple-level earning patterns, provided a 
striking statistical portrait of these changes.  In 1970, over 50% of all married couples between 
the ages of 25 and 54 had an economic structure in which the husband was the sole earner, but by 
2001, that proportion had shrunk to 25% and the dominant form of family (over 70%) had 
become dual-earner.  Among families with a dual-earner form in 1970, a large majority—nearly 
three-quarters—were characterized by a structure in which the husband contributed more than 
60% of the couple’s earnings (Raley et al., 2006). Within the 30-year span, this proportion had 
dropped significantly: almost half of such couples were equal-earners (with each partner 
contributing between 40% and 60% of total household income) or had the wife as the primary 
earner (Jacobs & Gerson, 1998; Raley et al., 2006; Winkler, McBride, & Andrews, 2005).  Thus, 
the majority of families in the 21st century bear little resemblance to the previously normative 
male-breadwinner/female-homemaker form (Ferree, 2010; Moen & Roehling, 2005). 
Scholars are interested in the implications of these economic shifts for family functioning 
and individuals’ well-being. Career and family satisfaction are two potential affective responses 
of individuals that are significant because they are considered indicators of domain-specific well-
being and, hence, may reflect global well-being (Carlson, Grzywacz, & Kacmar, 2010). Yet a 
review of the research that explores the implications of family economic structure of married 
other-sex men and women reveals that it mainly focuses on behaviors within the family domain, 
particularly on two behaviors: division of household labor and divorce. Most studies on these 
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latter topics draw on theories, such as the bargaining/exchange theory, which imply low family 
and/or marital satisfaction. However, little empirical work has documented the theorized 
attitudes that are presumably associated with variations in family economic structure or their 
intervening role between economic structure and observed rates of divorce or patterns of 
household labor (Brennan, Barnett, & Gareis, 2001; Sayer & Bianchi, 2000). 
Moreover, the impact of family economic structure on other subjective outcomes, such as 
career satisfaction, is largely uncharted territory.  Career satisfaction has been studied as an 
important influence on turnover, employee motivation, and other outcomes that are related to 
organizational success.  Most work on the sources of career satisfaction has focused on 
individual dispositions (McClelland, 1984; Schein, 1978) or, less commonly, on work 
characteristics or work-related outcomes, such as labor force attachment (Jacob & Kleinert, 
2014; Shafer, 2011).  Family economic structure, which represents the nexus of work and family 
domains, is not known to have been considered in this context. Yet research on the relation 
between compensation and career satisfaction suggests one plausible link between family 
economic structure and career attitudes. Researchers who study compensation typically assume 
that individuals compare their objective career achievements (i.e., earnings and promotions) with 
others to gauge how well they are doing and that this social comparison is an important source of 
career satisfaction (Valcour & Tolbert, 2003). However, few studies have investigated 
individuals’ choice of comparison others. It is likely, we argue, that husbands and wives will use 
spouses as a point of comparison in evaluating their individual work achievements (Shafer, 
2011).  
Thus, we use data from a two-panel, couple-level survey of full-time employed middle-
class American other-sex families to contribute to the growing body of literature that has 
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examined the impact of family economic structures on individuals’ well-being by focusing on its 
effects in both the work and family domains, specifically on career satisfaction and family 
satisfaction.  In doing so, we build on the “doing gender” perspective (Deutsch, 2007; West & 
Zimmerman, 1987).  This framework has been used to explain how wives’ relatively high 
earnings, compared to their spouses’, affect behaviors and choices at home (Bittman, England, 
Folbre, Sayer, & Matheson, 2003; Schneider, 2011; Weisshaar, 2014).  We suggest that attitudes 
are another important venue for the construction of gender. According to this line of research, 
when wives out-earn their husbands, the male-breadwinner/female-homemaker gender norm is 
violated, creating tensions between spouses and pressures to compensate for such deviance by 
enacting a more traditional division of household labor. These studies thus imply a negative 
effect of wives’ higher earnings on family satisfaction, which leads to such behavioral responses, 
but little evidence exists about whether pressures to “do gender” are related to family 
dissatisfaction, or affect both spouses to the same degree. Relatedly, whereas the traditional 
male-breadwinner role inherently connects achievement in both work and family domains, the 
traditional female-homemaker role does not provide such a connection between work and family 
domains. Furthermore, in light of the publicity often given to the long-standing gender-based 
earnings gap, women who attain relatively high levels of compensation may not see themselves 
as gender deviants in the work domain. This reasoning suggests the need to investigate the need 
to “do gender” in relation to attitudes separately for men and women, as well as on family- and 
work-related outcomes.  
In sum, we seek to extend research on variations in family economic structure by 
examining three questions: (a) whether family economic structure does impact family 
satisfaction as implied by previous research, (b) whether the influence of family economic 
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structure extends to career satisfaction, and (c) whether there are differences between husbands 
and wives in terms of these impacts. Our ability to reflect the transitory nature of families’ 
economic structure on these attitudes could offer further insights into processes of adaptation to 
these structures. 
Consequences of Family Economic Structure 
Contemporary family researchers have examined the impact of family economic structure 
on a number of outcomes. Two of the most frequently studied are marital dissolution and 
changes in the division of household labor. Whereas the accumulating evidence on these 
outcomes is relatively consistent, the attitudinal factors that underlie and produce them are not 
well-understood.  
Theoretically, research on earnings and spouses’ behaviors typically draws on a 
bargaining/exchange theory, which predicts that a spouse who has more resources (e,g., earnings 
from employment) is better able to bargain for what he or she wants (Blood & Wolf, 1960). With 
regard to marital stability, this theory predicts that decreased satisfaction with family 
arrangements as spousal earnings become more equal is likely to result in divorce. The 
commonly posited “women’s independence hypothesis” (Oppenheimer, 1997) also follows the 
bargaining/exchange model because women who are unhappy in their marriage are presumably 
freer to divorce if they are financially independent. This argument is consistent with findings 
from a variety of empirical studies indicating positive effects of increases in wives’ relative 
earnings on likelihood of divorce and/or separation (Cooke, 2006; Hannan, Tuma & Groenveld, 
1977; Heckert, Nowak, & Snyder, 1998; Nock, 2001; Rogers, 2004; Rossi & Rossi, 1990). 
Although spouses’ increasing financial independence may make it more feasible for 
partners to end unsatisfying marriages (Sayer & Bianchi, 2000; Sayer, England, Allison, & 
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Kangas, 2011; South & Lloyd, 1995; Teachman, 2010), it is not entirely clear why independence 
should lead to greater marital or family unhappiness per se, which are, presumably, the 
proximate sources of marital dissolution.  In fact, the increased overall family income associated 
with dual-earner and equal-earner arrangements could be expected to bring benefits that make 
remaining in a marriage more attractive, and thereby enhance family stability (Cherlin, 1979; 
Hoffman & Duncan, 1995; Özcan & Breen, 2012; Ross & Sawhill, 1975; South & Lloyd, 1995).  
Thus, a key limitation of the bargaining/exchange approach is that it is largely silent on the 
attitudinal and perceptual mechanisms that underpin the posited (and documented) relation 
between family economic structure and marital stability.   
In the case of housework, according to bargaining/exchange theory, equal earnings are 
expected to result in more equitable division of housework between spouses. However, a 
growing body of evidence indicates that the rules of economic exchange do not predict who does 
the housework once wives’ relative earnings exceed their husbands’. Although the division of 
housework tends to become more equitable as wives’ relative household earnings increase from 
none to about half, it then reverts to a more traditional division as wives become the primary 
breadwinner—either because husbands reduce their domestic labor time (Brines, 1994; 
Greenstein, 2000; Thebaud, 2010) or because wives increase theirs (Bittman et al., 2003; 
Killewald, 2011; Schneider, 2011).  
Because these empirical findings are not readily explained from the vantage point of 
bargaining/exchange theory, this latter phenomenon regarding housework has been attributed to 
couples' “doing gender” in their marital relationship (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994). 
According to this perspective, housework is seen not only as the performance of various chores 
but also as an arena for the enactment of gender (Schneider, 2012). By engaging in housework, 
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individuals conform to prescriptive expectations of gender and place themselves into the 
cognitively recognizable categories of men and women (West & Zimmerman, 1987, 2009). In 
line with the notion that dominant family gender roles cast men as primary breadwinners, the 
curvilinear relationship between family economic structure and the division of housework is 
typically explained in terms of pressures to conform to such roles. Thus individuals correct 
deviations from family gender roles in the work sphere by adhering more strictly to them in the 
domestic sphere (Bittman et al., 2003; Greenstein, 2000). This need to neutralize gender 
deviance (Bittman et al., 2003) implies decreased satisfaction with family arrangements as 
spousal earnings become more equal. Yet, as with the theory and research on patterns of divorce, 
the attitudinal sources of the observed changes in division of household labor are left rather 
opaque by work in this area.  It is unclear whether husbands or wives or both spouses experience 
dissatisfaction as a result of family role deviance. 
Our literature review revealed only two studies that have investigated the relationships 
between family economic structure and spouses’ work careers, and both have also focused on 
behavioral outcomes, namely labor force attachment (Jacob & Kleinert, 2014; Shafer, 2011). The 
studies reported that wives are more likely to exit the labor force (Shafer, 2011) and refrain from 
re-entering (Jacob & Kleinert, 2014) if their earnings are relatively low compared to their 
husbands’. It is worth noting that Jacob and Kleinert (2014) also examined unemployed men and, 
contrary to their expectations, found that unemployed men who were formerly minor earners 
refrained from re-entering paid work. Thus, unemployed men with lower earnings than their 
wives before they became unemployed did not try as quickly as possible to correct their 
deviation from the breadwinner role by (at least) returning to employment. These behavioral 
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patterns by unemployed men may reflect low career satisfaction prior to their unemployment, yet 
these outcomes have yet to be investigated.  
Taken together, previous studies on the implications of families’ economic structure on 
both family and work-related behaviors suggest that men and women evaluate the worth of their 
earnings against their spouses’ earnings and these evaluations often have gendered outcomes. 
Nevertheless, we still do not have much direct empirical evidence of the relationship between 
families’ economic structure and individuals’ attitudinal reactions that underlie and produce 
them.  
Family Economic Structure and Satisfaction 
We argue that the different economic contributions of each spouse to the household are 
one more way in which gender inequalities are expressed and reproduced. In order to explain the 
meanings spouses attach to family economic structure when evaluating family and career 
satisfaction, we specifically build on the “doing gender” perspective (West & Zimmerman, 1987, 
2009).  This approach is based on the premise that gender is produced and reproduced actively in 
everyday interactions between men and women and is displayed particularly strongly in counter-
normative situations (Jacob & Kleinert, 2014). The situations in which the wife earns more than 
her husband does, or when both earn about the same, are both counter-normative, especially for 
men, because they mean the loss of the normative role of family breadwinner.  
Generally, as we reviewed previously, studies treat “doing gender” as involving 
performances that reproduce existing normative conceptions. “Doing gender,” however, is an 
active process reflecting the institutional shaping of gender relations (Cooke, 2006). Structural 
and cultural incompatibilities between the home and the workplace may inform differently what 
“doing gender” means in each sphere. This means that failure to adhere to the normative male-
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breadwinner role as a result of wives’ relatively higher earnings may have different meanings for 
men and women in the family sphere than in the work sphere.  
While conventional gender roles are reconstructed and negotiated at home in response to 
women’s economic independence, among other things, such dynamics also unfold at the work 
domain, in a related, but different, cultural and structural context. The substantial increase in 
households in which the wife is the main earner would not have been possible if women had not 
markedly changed their roles in the workplace (Deutsch, 2007; England, 2010). Social and 
economic changes from the 1970s onward provided women with both the ability and strong 
incentives to enter the paid labor force (Cotter, Hermsen & Vanneman, 2004; England, 2010; 
Goldin & Katz, 2002; Sayer et al., 2011). As women’s participation in the labor force increased, 
so did concerns about gender equity in pay and expectations for increases in women’s relative 
compensation (Dobbin, 2009; Treas & Widmer, 2000). 
Interestingly, research suggests that these expectations were accompanied by changes in 
stereotypes about women’s behaviors at work. Diekman and Eagly (2000) showed in a series of 
experiments that individuals perceive an erosion of gender differences in work attitudes and 
behaviors. Specifically, respondents saw a convergence in women’s and men’s personality 
characteristics (with women increasingly perceived to have traditionally masculine 
characteristics such as competitive, daring, adventurous, aggressive), as well as in their cognitive 
and even physical characteristics. In this context, it seems reasonable to expect that both men and 
women will attach importance to compensation as a key criterion in evaluating their success in 
the workplace. Furthermore, compensation is a well-established predictor of perceived career 
success and career satisfaction (Judge, Cable, Boudreau & Bretz, 1995; Valcour & Tolbert, 
2003). Although studies of the determinants of career satisfaction commonly assumed that 
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individuals compare their objective career achievements with others to gauge how well they are 
doing (Judge et al., 1995; Judge, Piccolo, Podsakoff, Shaw, & Rich, 2010; Kirchmeyer, 1998; 
Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005; Tharenou, 2001; Valcour & Tolbert, 2003), how this is 
done or who is used as a comparison other are issues that are largely unexplored.  Rather, most 
research examined absolute values of salary and/or number of promotions as predictors of 
subjective levels of career success.   
However, the choice of social references may be a critical mediator of the impact of 
absolute indicators of career achievement on job and career satisfaction, as suggested by 
Crosby’s (1982) classic work on women’s relatively high levels of job satisfaction, despite lower 
earnings than men’s. It seems likely that husbands and wives will use spouses as a point of 
comparison in evaluating their own separate work achievements (Shafer, 2011). Policies of pay 
secrecy in many organizations and general social norms against informal sharing of pay 
information (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) can make such work-based comparisons problematic, but 
in dual-earner families, spouses can provide ready referents because their wage information is 
generally readily available to partners.  
In view of these perceptions of compensation in the workplace, women who attain 
relatively high levels of compensation will not see themselves as gender deviants in the work 
sphere, but we do not expect this to be the case when they evaluate their performance at home. 
Within the family domain, as studies on division of housework have shown, women’s strong 
earnings power is not often celebrated by men—nor by women. Indeed, qualitative studies have 
indicated that maintaining men’s power within marriage, especially in the absence of their 
economic dominance, can be a constant struggle that takes a toll. As the “doing gender” 
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perspective suggests, many couples portray this situation as a stressful one, describing ways in 
which both spouses work together to hide or ignore wives' income advantage (Tichenor, 2005). 
In light of the publicity often given to the long-standing gender-based earnings gap and 
standard expectations that men will out-earn women (Moen & Roehling, 2005), we expect men 
to more negatively evaluate their own family and career achievements as their wives’ earnings 
approach parity with their own, compared to men in couples with more conventional earnings 
arrangements. Because the social changes in gender roles that have occurred to a greater extent 
in the public than the private sphere have affected women's lives more than men's lives 
(Diekman & Eagly, 2000; England, 2010), women who attain relatively high levels of 
compensation will not see themselves as gender deviants in the work domain. There is no 
conflict between “doing gender” and having strong earnings power; thus we expect their 
earnings to contribute to increased career satisfaction. However, within the family sphere, we 
expect wives, as both previous empirical research and the “gender deviance neutralization” 
hypothesis have suggested, to experience lower family satisfaction as their earnings are similar to 
or higher than those of their husbands, compared to wives in couples with more conventional 
earnings arrangements. Moreover, because family roles are more salient to women’s identity 
(Cinamon & Rich, 2002), they are more likely to acknowledge and register such dissatisfaction 
in survey responses than are men.   
The Present Study 
Based on our review, then, we expect that family economic structure will affect both 
family and career satisfaction and that these effects will vary by gender.  Specifically, we 
propose that the more equal the earnings of spouses, the lower husbands’ and wives’ levels of 
family satisfaction will be (Hypothesis 1a). Furthermore, the effect of earnings equality among 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
FAMILY ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 13 
 
spouses on family satisfaction will be greater for women than for men (Hypothesis 1b). Finally, 
we expect that the more equal the earnings of spouses, the higher wives’ career satisfaction will 
be (Hypothesis 2a) and the lower husbands’ career satisfaction will be (Hypothesis 2b).  
In examining these hypotheses, we take into account other variables that are likely to 
affect our outcomes of interest (family and career satisfaction) and/or family economic structure. 
Specifically, our predictors include wife's share of the household labor, family income, the 
number of children living at home (Kanji & Schober, 2014), level of education, occupational 
status, and age. The relationship between family economic structure and our outcomes may also 
depend on gender-role ideology (Brennan et al., 2001; Furdyna, Tucker, & James, 2008). To 
address issues of social selection, reflecting the impact of exogenous factors on family economic 
structure, we also control for wife’s and husband’s health (Springer, 2010), as well as for 
spouses’ job involvement.  
Methods 
Dataset and Procedure  
The data used in our study are from the two-panel Ecology of Careers Study, a sample of 
U.S. middle-class, dual-earner couples. Respondents and their spouses were interviewed 
(separately) in two waves, 2 years apart, beginning in 1998 and continuing through 2002. The 
Ecology of Careers Study comprises three research initiatives, all conducted in the same area of 
upstate New York, USA. The three initiatives were designed to be flexibly integrated so 
researchers could take advantage of the increased sample generated by combining the datasets. In 
the first two studies, respondents were recruited from employees working for 11 major 
employers (representing a diverse set of industries, including higher education, utilities, 
manufacturing, and health care). In the third study, sampling occurred through residence in 
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neighborhoods where employees of these companies were concentrated. This third sample was 
constructed from a random selection of couples living within a 57 census block groups of each 
employee who had been selected to participate in the employer-based surveys. Questions from 
the first employer-based survey provided the base design for subsequent studies. We found the 
survey type to have no effect on the results, and therefore we did not include it as a variable in 
the analyses presented here. The Ecology of Careers Study was intended to capture the work and 
family experiences of U.S. middle-class couples (for whom at least one member had some 
college education) and as such it does not represent all groups within the general population. 
However, these data are especially advantageous for their couple-level structure, offering 
information from both the husbands’ and wives’ perspectives.   
Survey respondents were interviewed using a computer-assisted telephone interview 
(CATI) system.  Each survey took approximately 40–60 minutes to complete. All participants 
were paid $25 for answering the survey questions. Information was collected on current work 
and family characteristics, as well as life histories, for 4,637 respondents (1,914 couples) in the 
first wave of the surveys and 3,893 (1,558 couples) in the second wave.  Because we were 
particularly interested in couples where both spouses had a strong attachment to the labor force 
and because this focus simplified construction of our main independent variable (family form), 
we used data from 482 other-sex couples (964 respondents) in which both members were 
employed full-time (35 or more hours per week) in both survey waves.  Very few respondents—
only 89 individuals (less than 3% of the total surveyed) —divorced or separated between the two 
survey waves.  For simplicity, we excluded the latter cases from our analysis, which reduced our 
final sample to 459 couples, or 918 respondents. Respondents excluded on the basis of these 
decisions were not significantly different from those remaining in the analysis on all covariates, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
FAMILY ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 15 
 
except for weekly working hours, with the former working, on average, an hour more than the 
latter. 
Measures 
Family and career satisfaction. We examined two dependent variables, family 
satisfaction and career satisfaction, based on responses from the second wave of the surveys.  
Family satisfaction was operationalized using a five-item scale (α = .84) from 1 (never) to 5 
(always) for all items.  Items were: “You are satisfied that you can turn to your family for help 
when something is troubling you”; “You are satisfied with the way your family expresses 
affection, and responds to your emotion, such as anger, sorrow or love”; “You are satisfied with 
the way your family talks over things with you and shares problems with you”; “You are 
satisfied with the way your family and you share time together”; and “You are satisfied that your 
family accepts and supports your wishes to take on new activities or directions” (Smilkstein, 
1978). Because our measure of family satisfaction was highly skewed, we dichotomized the 
scale, with "high family satisfaction" (average score above 4) coded as 1 and others 0; this 
procedure is similar to that used in other recent studies (Furdyna et al., 2008; Kaufman & 
Taniguchi, 2006). Nearly 58% (n = 267) of the wives fell into the category of “high family 
satisfaction,” as did 54% % (n = 245) of the husbands.  
Career satisfaction was also measured with a five-item scale (α = .86) from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for all items. We asked respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement with the following statements: “I am satisfied with the success I have achieved in my 
career,” “I am satisfied with the progress I have made toward meeting my overall career goals,” 
“I am satisfied with the progress I have made toward meeting my financial objectives,” “I am 
satisfied with the progress I have made toward meeting my goals for advancement,” and “I am 
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satisfied with the progress I have made toward meeting my goals for the development of new 
skills” (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990). As with the family satisfaction scale, this 
scale was also skewed, leading us again to create a dummy variable as our key measure.  Cases 
in which the average score was 4 or above were coded 1 with the others coded as 0.  Just a little 
fewer than 50% (n = 223) of the wives were classified as “high career satisfaction”; nearly 40% 
(n = 178) of the husbands. 
Our decisions to represent career and family satisfaction as dummy variables were based 
in part on the examination of the normality of the residuals from OLS models using the variables 
described in the following. For both family and career satisfaction, the distribution of the 
residuals in these models significantly differed from a normal distribution, with the deviations 
more evident for the upper and lower tail of the distribution. Skewness and kurtosis tests both 
revealed deviations from normality for the residuals for each measure. Similar results were 
obtained when we transformed family and career satisfaction by taking their natural logarithm, 
thus supporting the decision to dichotomize the variables.   
We used data from both survey waves to define four economic family forms based on 
spouses' combined yearly salaries. Based on prior studies (Nock, 2001; Raley et al., 2006; 
Winkler, et al., 2005), for descriptive purposes we divided the couples into four groups: (a) 
Stably Traditional Earners, that is, couples in which the husband contributed 60% or more of the 
combined salaries in both waves; (b) Stably Equal Earners, that is, couples in which each 
member earned between 40 and 59% of the combined salaries in both waves; (c) Transitioned 
toward Equality, that is, couples in which husbands earned more than 60% of the combined 
salaries in the first wave, but not in the second; and (d) Transitioned toward Traditional, that is, 
couples with the reverse pattern of the third set. Note that these categories already take into 
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account the potentially transitory nature of families’ economic structure by considering relative 
earnings in both waves of the surveys (Jacobs & Gerson, 2004; Winslow-Bowe, 2006). Another 
type of economic family form is one where the wife was the main earner in both waves (i.e., the 
wife contributed 60% or more of the combined salaries), but because there were only four 
families with this form, we excluded these cases from our analyses. However, whereas these 
categories allow us to describe the data in a concise way, to avoid arbitrary cut-points, we used a 
continuous measure for analytical purposes.  Thus, in the models described in the following, our 
measure defines family economic form as the ratio of the wife’s salary to the combined 
household earnings. Because the family economic form changed, in some cases, between the first 
and second waves, we also account for the change in the wives' share of earnings between Wave 
1 and Wave 2 by including a measure gauging the change in relative wage within the household 
between Wave 1 and Wave 2.    
Control variables. With one exception, our control variables are based on data from the 
second survey wave. Information on the control variables is presented in Table 1. To measure 
division of household labor, we used responses from each member of a couple to a question on 
the average number of minutes spent per workday on household chores to construct a combined 
measure of total time spent by both spouses, and then we divided the wife’s report of how much 
time she spent by this total. As reported in Table 1, on average wives reported doing more 
housework than the husbands.  
Gender role ideology was measured by a scale constructed from four items (α = .78), 
each ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). We asked respondents to indicate 
their level of agreement with the following statements: "It is usually better for everyone if the 
man is the main provider and the woman takes care of the home and family," "It is more 
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important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself,” “Preschoolers suffer 
when their mother works,” and “A working mother can establish just as good a relationship with 
her children as a mother who does not work” (General Social Survey, 1998). This measure was 
the only one based on questions asked in the first survey wave because these items were not 
included in the second-wave surveys.  Unsurprisingly, women expressed more gender egalitarian 
views than men. Individuals’ health was assessed by a self-reported item, “Think of a scale from 
0 to 10, where 0 is a person with serious health problems and 10 is a person in the very best 
health. On this scale of 0 to 10, what number best indicates how your health has been lately.” 
Job involvement was measured by a scale constructed from five items (α = .70), each 
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). We asked respondents to indicate their 
level of agreement with the following statements: “My work is an important part of who I am,” 
“I would work if I did not need the money,” “I work because I have to,” “My work has an 
important place in my life,” and “Working has little to do with feeling about self” (drawn from 
Lodahl & Kejner, 1965). Surprisingly, women reported greater job involvement. However, on 
our measure of hours of work per week, men reported working longer hours.  
Our other measures are straightforward.  Our measure of occupational status was a 
dummy variable coded 1 if a respondent was a professional or manager; a similar measure was 
constructed for spouses’ occupational status. The education measures were also created as 
dummy variables, with 1 indicating that an individual (or spouse, for the measure of spouse’s 
education) had a college degree. For both education and occupation, the distribution was similar 
for women and men. Age was measured in number of years. We measured family size as the 
number of children living at home, using wives' reports.  Our measure of family earnings was 
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constructed by adding husbands’ and wives’ individual salaries together; to correct for skew, this 
measure was logged.  
The data contained missing information for 11 (1.2%) individuals on at least one of the 
following variables: respondents' and spouse working hours, job involvement, respondents' and 
spouse health, and division of household labor. Analyses using multiple imputation produced 
results that were identical to those reported in the following, which were based on a single 
regression-based imputation of the scores. We also explored collinearity among the predictor 
variables. Results indicated the overall variance inflation factor was low (1.43), with only 
respondents' and spouse age exceeding 2.5 (at 4 .15 and 4.18, respectively).           
 Analyses. Because both the family and career satisfaction measures were dichotomized, 
we used logistic regression models to assess the impact of the independent variables on these 
outcomes.  Although the original dataset was assembled at the couple level, because models for 
male and female respondents exhibited the same level of residual variation, we pooled the data in 
order to examine interactions between gender and our other variables.  There are two aspects in 
which the data are nested, by couple and by employing organization (because the sampling 
procedures were based in part on respondents from 11 organizations, described previously). We 
used the clustered standard errors specification for logistic regression in STATA to correct biases 
in standard errors resulting from couple-level nesting [i.e., vce (cluster cluster_id)]. To address 
employer-related effects, we included main employer fixed effects.   
To address concerns regarding reverse causality, we limit our sample to other-sex couples 
who were married at both time points and were both employed full-time at both time points. 
Hence, an increased work effort in anticipation of divorce or of reduced family satisfaction is 
unlikely to occur among respondents in our sample. In addition, we address the possibility that 
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satisfaction in both domains shapes family economic form (see Özcan & Breen, 2012, for a 
related concern regarding divorce and women's employment). Regarding family satisfaction, we 
estimated a model predicting family satisfaction while controlling for prior levels of marital 
satisfaction, which is highly correlated with family satisfaction (Brennan et al., 2001). Findings 
from this model are reported at the end of the results section. Unfortunately, we do not have a 
measure of career satisfaction in Wave 1 and, hence, we cannot rule out the possibility of reverse 
causality, with lower career satisfaction leading to changes in family-related behavior and thus 
family satisfaction. We do, however, control for job involvement and report the following results 
from a model controlling for the respondents' earnings at time 1, hence partially accounting for 
career orientations, which can shape both family economic form and family satisfaction.  In 
addition, for both types of satisfaction, we establish the time order requirement of a causal 
account by measuring family economic form first and subsequently measuring satisfaction 
outcomes.   
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics for each of the economic forms of families, 
including the percent of husbands and wives in each type and indicating high levels of family 
and career satisfaction. In general, Stably Equal Earner couples and Stably Traditional Earner 
couples showed the most significant differences, although such differences were fairly small in 
absolute magnitude, as well as with respect to their effect sizes.  Wives in Stably Equal Earner 
couples were, on average, somewhat younger, more likely to have completed college, and to be 
professionals or managers compared to wives in Stably Traditional Earner couples.  Husbands in 
Stably Equal Earner couples also tended to be younger, to be less likely to have completed 
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college, and to be professionals or managers than those in Stably Traditional Earner couples.  
Stable Equal Earner couples were also distinguished from others by the relatively high level of 
wives’ education compared to their husbands’; in other couples, husbands generally had higher 
levels of education.  Across all categories, husbands reported working somewhat longer hours 
than wives (recall that we selected couples for whom both are employed full-time).  Couples who 
transitioned from equal toward traditional economic arrangements had the highest level of family 
income, followed by Stably Traditional Earner couples.   
 In terms of our primary outcome variables, on average, the family satisfaction of wives in 
Stably Equal Earner couples was significantly lower than that of Stably Traditional Earner or of 
those Transitioned toward Equality couples (although the proportion expressing high levels of 
satisfaction were also noticeably higher for wives in couples who transitioned toward traditional 
arrangements, the lack of significance probably reflects the small number of cases in the latter 
category.)  Levels of family satisfaction among husbands varied little across husbands in Stably 
Traditional Earner, Transitioned toward Equality Earner, and Transitioned toward Traditional 
Earner couples.  Wives in Stably Traditional Earner couples were noticeably less apt to express 
satisfaction with their careers than were wives in other categories; the difference between wives 
in Stably Traditional Earner and Stably Equal Earner categories is just below the 
conventional .05 level.  At the same time, a markedly lower percent of husbands in the Stably 
Equal Earner category expressed very high levels of career satisfaction compared to husbands in 
Stably Traditional Earner couples. Notably, effects sizes were the highest for wife's family 
satisfaction and husband's career satisfaction.   
Hypothesis Testing 
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 To explore these preliminary differences in more detail, we turn to the results of the 
logistic regression analyses. As mentioned above, family economic form is identified in these 
models as the ratio of the wives salary to the combined household earnings, while controlling for 
the change in the wives' share of earnings between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Table 3 provides the 
results of the analyses examining family satisfaction; Table 4 provides the counterpart analyses 
of career satisfaction. In both tables, we began with a model including all control variables and a 
variable measuring family economic form. The second model added change in the wives' share 
of earnings between wave 1 and wave 2, hence allowing for the transitory nature of family 
economic form to exert an effect on satisfaction.  Because hypotheses 1b, 2a, and 2b explicitly 
take into account gender differences in the association between family economic form and 
satisfaction we add, in model 3, an interaction between family economic form and gender.  
Starting with the results on family satisfaction presented in Table 3, the coefficient for 
family economic form was not significant in any of the three models, nor was the coefficient for 
the interaction between family economic form and gender significant. Hence, Hypotheses 1a and 
1b did not receive support. However, results from Models 2 and 3 indicate that family 
satisfaction decreased in transitioning households where earnings became more equal between 
Waves 1 and 2. This finding suggests that individuals respond, at the family domain, mainly to 
changes in division of labor and not to long-term household-level patterns, which plausibly 
reflect underling stable attitudes and arrangements. We found no gender differences with respect 
to this effect. Additional significant predictors of family satisfaction identified in Table 3 are the 
number of children (negatively associated with satisfaction) and health (positively associated 
with satisfaction).     
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In Table 4, we examine similar models predicting individuals’ satisfaction with their 
career.  Family economic form was not significantly associated with career satisfaction in 
Models 1 and 2.  However, when we allow for an interaction between family economic form and 
participants’ gender in Model 3, results indicated that greater equality is associated with higher 
satisfaction among women and lower satisfaction among men, in line with Hypotheses 2a and 
2b. We illustrate these results in Figure 1. As the figure demonstrates, in more traditional-earner 
households, career satisfaction is much higher for husbands than for wives. As earnings become 
more equal, satisfaction by wives increases whereas that of husbands decreases. As a result, in 
household where earnings are equal or close to being equal, the career satisfaction of husbands is 
dramatically lower than that of their wives.  
Of the control variables, being female and having a higher household income had the 
strongest effects. The finding from Models 1 and 2, that women were more likely than men to 
express high levels of career satisfaction, may reflect the lower pressure on women generally to 
maximize career achievements.  Lower expectations can make it easier to be satisfied with more 
modest actual outcomes. Net of household income and occupation, greater educational 
attainment was negatively associated with perceived career success, also possibly because of a 
link between educational attainment and higher expectations for career achievement.  Spouses’ 
educational attainment also had a negative effect on career satisfaction, presumably via the same 
route. Holding all other variables constant, individuals who work more hours per week expressed 
greater career satisfaction (in Models 1 and 2), as did those who felt in better health.  
Model Specifications 
We undertook a number of additional analyses to test the sensitivity of our results to 
model specifications. First, we added an interaction for gender with the measures of gender-role 
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ideology and division of household labor.  We also explored three-way interactions (gender x 
gender-role ideology x equal-earner form; gender x division of household labor x equal-earner 
form).  None of the interaction coefficients came close to attaining significance. We also 
estimated a model predicting family satisfaction, controlling for the wife's log earnings and a 
model controlling for the level of marital satisfaction reported in Wave 1. Both models produced 
results that were similar to those reported in Table 2. Similar to the models for family 
satisfaction, we also estimated a model for career satisfaction controlling for the wife's log 
earnings. Results from this model were similar to those reported in Table 4. Concerns regarding 
item non-response prompted us to compare the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 to those using 
multiply-imputed information for the 1.2% of our sample for whom information was missing for 
at least one variable. Results from the latter models were identical to those reported previously. 
Finally, we ran OLS versions of these models with the 5-point measures of each dependent 
variable. The direction of the effects was consistently the same as in those shown here.  Given 
the degree of skew in the outcome variables, we think that our dichotomized measures are more 
appropriate.  
Discussion 
In the present paper, we examined the impact of relative spousal earnings on husbands’ 
and wives’ family and career satisfaction, two attitudes that we argue are key to understanding 
pressures that shape “doing gender” in families.  Using data from a two-wave survey of other-sex 
married couples in the United States, we found negligible effects of family economic structure 
on family satisfaction for either husbands or wives.  These results are rather surprising in light of 
the variety of studies documenting a negative relationship between higher levels of wives’ 
relative earnings and marital instability (Cooke, 2006; Nock, 2001; Rogers, 2004; Rossi & Rossi, 
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1990). This existing work implies reduced family satisfaction as a likely intervening mechanism.  
Likewise, research suggesting an increased need in families to “do gender” in response to wives’ 
increasing relative earnings, by adopting a more traditional division of household labor, similarly 
implies lowered family satisfaction with higher earnings by wives (Brines, 1994; Bittman et al., 
2003).  We did find a significant reduction in family satisfaction among couples that have 
recently shifted towards a more equal-earner economic structure.  One interpretation of these 
results is that family dissatisfaction is likely to be triggered by changes in the earnings patterns 
of spouses, particularly increases in wives’ earnings, but that this is not necessarily an enduring 
problem.  Couples whose family economic structures remain stable, even when these run counter 
to conventional gender norms, may adapt both their attitudes and behavior, lessening initial 
dissatisfaction and the chances of marital dissolution.   
 Our analyses of career satisfaction indicate a more enduring impact of family economic 
structure on career satisfaction, an impact that takes very different directions for husbands and 
wives. When wives’ earnings increase relative to their husbands’, their career satisfaction is 
significantly increased, whereas that of their husbands is significantly depressed. We interpret 
this effect in terms of social comparison processes, where spouses use each other to assess their 
level of career success. Given the general societal pattern where women earn significantly less 
than men, on average, when a wife’s salary is relatively close to that of her husband’s, she is 
more likely to feel successful and thus express high levels of career satisfaction. Because 
workplace norms valorize high earnings for both men and women, women with relatively high 
levels of compensation may not feel like gender deviants in this domain, but traditional 
breadwinner norms may lead their spouses to experience a sense of deviance and thus to be less 
satisfied with their careers as spousal earnings approach parity.  
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Limitations and Future Research Directions  
Like any research, our study has some limitations. First, we examine family economic 
structure in both waves of the survey, but other variables are taken from only one wave of 
dataset. Because we do not examine changes in the variables directly, we are constrained in our 
ability to make inferences regarding the causal status of key variables in our study. Most 
importantly, although we tried to address reverse causality concerns with respect to family 
satisfaction by controlling for prior level of marital satisfaction, we have no prior measure of 
career satisfaction.  
In addition, our measures of division of household labor were limited. Time spent on 
housework per se may be a relatively weak indicator of the extent of household labor, which 
includes childcare and general planning and scheduling for the household; these facets of 
domestic labor may not be well-reflected in our measure (Carlson, Pilkauskas, McLanahan, & 
Brooks-Gunn, 2011; Schober, 2012). Future studies should examine more closely the extent to 
which the effects of women’s share of household income on family satisfaction and related 
outcomes is moderated by other dimensions of division of household labor and various aspects of 
women's bargaining power.  
Finally, we limited our analysis to middle-class other-sex couples who were both 
employed full-time (i.e., 35 hours of work a week or more) over the 2-year period of our surveys 
and who remained married. Future research is needed to enhance the generalizability of this 
research’s findings to a more representative population as well as to more diverse 
subpopulations.  
Practice Implications 
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 The relationship between family economic arrangements and family outcomes has been 
the focus of policy-oriented research at least since the 1970s when a number of social 
experiments provided evidence of a positive impact of increased economic support to low-
income families on rates of marital dissolution (Hannan, Tuma & Groenveld, 1977).  Since then, 
other studies, using data on individuals at varying socioeconomic levels, have also linked 
increasing parity in spousal earnings to greater chances of divorce (Cooke, 2006; Nock, 2001; 
Rossi & Rossi, 1990).   
As we have indicated, little empirical evidence exists on the impacts of different kinds of 
family economic structures on the attitudes and psychological responses that presumably 
underlie such observed behavioral patterns. But understanding these attitudes and psychological 
responses is key to addressing the problems. Thus, one implication of our study for those 
engaged in marital counseling is the need to explore fully both husbands’ and wives’ attachment 
and satisfaction with their work roles and to acknowledge disconnections between long-standing 
norms and actual contemporary earnings patterns as part of dealing with spousal conflict.  
Expressed dissatisfaction with family life may be less important than unexpressed satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with work achievements in resolving such conflict. From a larger policy 
standpoint, dissemination of information about changing patterns of family earnings, in the 
media and in the classroom, may help expedite the alignment between social expectations that 
shape individual relations within the family and economic reality.   
Conclusion 
The findings of our study suggest important avenues for developing a better theoretical 
understanding of the impact of family economic structure on family dynamics documented in 
previous work, such as inequalities in the division of household labor and marital dissolution. In 
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particular, by applying the “doing gender” perspective to the understanding of both work and 
family dynamics, our work underscores the need to consider how family structure is related to 
work attitudes of both spouses, as well as family attitudes, as mediators between family structure 
and such behavioral outcomes. Hence, our study juxtaposes family and work dynamics in 
analyzing and understanding how gender is enacted  
There are a variety of potential linkages that could be explored in this context. For 
example, a number of studies provide evidence that work status is more salient and important to 
men than to women (Cinamon & Rich, 2002; Honeycutt & Rosen, 1997).  Given this difference, 
it seems likely that lower career satisfaction is apt to lead women to disengage from work, 
whereas greater career satisfaction is more likely to enhance their work commitment. This is 
consistent with research showing that, net of husbands’ earnings, women in higher earning 
brackets are less likely to exit the labor force than are their lower-paid counterparts (Shafer, 
2011).   Likewise on the home front, women’s increased career satisfaction may lead to a greater 
sense of self-confidence and a greater willingness to bear the costs of marital dissolution in the 
way postulated by Oppenheimer’s (1997) independence hypothesis.  Thus, exploration of such 
relationships would offer a much more thorough understanding of previously documented 
behavioral relations. 
 Similarly, greater attention to intervening work attitudes may also help us better 
understand the dynamics of the division of household labor.  If men in more equal-earner couples 
experience less career satisfaction and then this leads them to devote more effort to improving 
their career prospects, this emphasis on career may partially explain men’s reduction on time 
spent on household labor found in some studies (e.g., Brines, 1994). Apart from reducing 
turnover, whether higher levels of career satisfaction might also reduce the intensity of time and 
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effort devoted to work activities by men (and increase the time spent on household labor) is an 
issue that awaits empirical evidence, although this is an interesting possibility. 
A key implication of our study is that, to understand the forces that shape “doing gender,” 
we need to shift our focus to the couple or family level of analysis and to explore the 
interactional aspects of this focus—including interrelated job attitudes—much more closely.  The 
rise of dual-earner couples as a dominant family form is one of the most significant social 
changes in recent U.S. history. Most workers in the Unites States are married to other workers, 
and they are susceptible to considerable new pressures and stresses because of the disjuncture 
between the way work is organized (typically based on the traditional homemaker/breadwinner 
model) and the fact that, increasingly, both spouses work in order to maintain or better their 
standard of living. Our study suggests that not only will employers need to adapt to this change, 
but societal norms, as reflected in individual attitudes, will also need to adapt in order for 
families to reap the full benefits.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
 Variables M SD Range  M SD Range 
Individuals 
 Husbands  Wives 
Age a 48.13 7.76 29-73  46.34 7.43 24-67 
College graduate (1=yes) 0.63    0.6   
Professional/manager (1=yes) 0.62     0.61   
Work hours/week a 47.42 7.72 35-80  44.2 7.71 35-100 
Job involvement scale a 2.74 0.45 1-4  2.82 0.51 1-4 
Health 8.18 1.43 2-10  8.33 1.5 2-10 
Gender role ideology scale a 3.62 0.71 1-5  3.87 0.79 1-5 
Household 
No. children at home 1.33 1.06 0-4     
Logged Household income 11.59 0.35 10.6 -12.7     
Wife’s proportion of housework time 0.57 0.17 0.1-0.99     
a Mean difference between husbands and wives is significant (p < .05).     
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables by Family Economic Structure 
  Family Economic Form   
  Stably 
Traditional 
Stably 
Equal 
Transitioned 
toward 
Equality 
Transitioned 
toward 
Traditional   
  n = 382 n = 396 n = 70 n = 70    
Variable 
M or % 
(SD) 
M or % 
(SD) 
M or % 
(SD) 
M or % 
(SD) 
ω2 /Cramer's 
V 
Wife's age 
47.8 a  
(7.4) 
45.2 b 
(7.1) 
46.1 ab  
(8.4) 
45.3 ab  
(7.4) .03 
Husband's age 
49.8 a 
(7.4) 
46.8 b 
(7.6) 
48.6 ab 
(9.4) 
46.1 ab 
(7.5) .04 
Wife's college graduate (1=yes) 56% 63% 46% 74% .12 
Husband's college grad. (1=yes) 72% 58% 63% 77% .14 
No. children at home 
1.2 a 
(1.1) 
1.5 b 
(1.1) 
1.1 a 
(.9) 
1.4 ab  
(1.1) .02 
Wife's prof./mgr. (1=yes) 50% 68% 69% 74% .18 
Husband's prof./mgr. (1=yes) 70% 53% 63% 71% .17 
Wife's work hours/week 
43.5 a  
(8.1) 
45.0 a 
(7.3) 
43.3 a 
(8.8) 
44.1 a 
(6.7) .01 
Husband's work hours/week 
48.1 a 
(7.5) 
46.8 a 
(7.9) 
48.5 a 
(8.3) 
46.5 a 
(7.0) .01 
Wife's job involvement scale 
2.87 a  
(.5) 
2.82 ab 
(.5) 
2.76 ab 
(.41) 
2.6 b 
(.4) .02 
Husband's job involvement scale 
2.77 a 
(.4) 
2.72 a 
(.4) 
2.74 a 
(.4) 
2.67 a 
(.5) .00 
Wife's health 
8.31 ab 
(1.5) 
8.32 ab 
(1.4) 
7.88 a 
(1.9) 
8.94 b 
(1.16) .02 
Husband's health 
8.17 a 
(1.4) 
8.14 a 
(1.4) 
8.11 a 
(1.8) 
8.48 a 
(.9) .00 
Household income (log) 
11.62 ac  
(.3) 
11.55 bc  
(.3) 
11.57 ab 
 (.3) 
11.73 c 
(.4) .02 
Wife's gender role ideology scale 
3.69 ac  
(.8) 
4.07 bc 
(.6) 
3.65 c 
(.9) 
3.94 ab  
(.8) .05 
Husband's gender role ideology 
scale 
3.42 a  
(.7) 
3.8 b 
(.6) 
3.59 ab 
(.9) 
3.72 ab 
(.6) .06 
Wife’s proportion housework time 
.58 a  
(.2) 
.55 a 
(.2) 
.61 a 
(.2) 
.58 a 
(.1) .01 
Wife's family sat. (% high) 63.90% 47.50% 74.30% 71.40% .19 
Husband's family sat.(% high) 52.40% 52.50% 51.40% 68.60% .08 
Wife's career sat. (% high) 41.40% 54.00% 54.30% 51.40% .12 
Husband's career sat. (% high) 45.50% 31.80% 40.00% 40.00% .13 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
FAMILY ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 40 
 
Note. Shared subscripts across a row indicate that the means are not significantly 
different (p > .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
FAMILY ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 41 
 
Table 3 
 
Estimated Logistic Regression Coefficients from Models Predicting Family Satisfaction 
 
Note. N = 918. Models include dummy variables for major employing organizations of 
respondents; coefficients not shown. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.   
 
  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variables Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE 
Female 0.143 (0.155)  0.142 (0.156)  1.005 (0.540) 
Age 0.010 (0.017)  0.010 (0.017)  0.012 (0.017) 
Spouse’s age -0.002 (0.017)  -0.002 (0.017)  -0.004 (0.017) 
College graduate 
          (reference: less than college) -0.032 (0.174) 
 
-0.044 (0.174) 
 
-0.004 (0.175) 
Spouse college graduate 
          (reference: less than college) 0.164 (0.167) 
 
0.153 (0.168) 
 
0.117 (0.169) 
No. children at home -.369*** (0.082)  -0.373*** (0.082)  -0.375*** (0.083) 
Professional/manager  
         (reference: other occupation) -0.028 (0.166) 
 
-0.025 (0.168) 
 
0.013 (0.169) 
Spouse professional/manager   
         (reference: other occupation) 0.375* (0.164) 
 
0.383* (0.165) 
 
0.342* (0.165) 
Hours worked/week -0.005 (0.009)  -0.003 (0.009)  -0.001 (0.009) 
Spouse’s hours worked/week -0.005 (0.009)  -0.002 (0.009)  -0.004 (0.009) 
Job involvement scale -0.107 (0.144)  -0.098 (0.145)  -0.101 (0.145) 
Health 0.159** (0.050)  0.150** (0.050)  0.154** (0.050) 
Spouse’s health 0.093* (0.045)  0.085 (0.046)  0.082 (0.045) 
Household income -0.431 (0.271)  -0.481 (0.269)  -0.492 (0.269) 
Gender role ideology scale 0.114 (0.100)  0.129 (0.103)  0.131 (0.103) 
Wife’s proportion housework time -0.412 (0.422)  -0.466 (0.421)  -0.464 (0.423) 
Ratio of wives’ earnings to total  
            earnings at wave 1 -0.442 (0.671) 
 
-0.914 (0.696) 
 
0.115 (0.936) 
Change in earnings ratio from  
            Wave 1 to Wave 2    
 
-3.117* (1.249) 
 
-3.136* (1.253) 
Gender X earnings ratio       -2.146 (1.305) 
Constant 3.841 (3.178)  4.549 (3.189)  4.225 (3.193) 
Pseudo R2 0.066  0.071  0.073 
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Table 4 
 
Estimated Logistic Regression Coefficients from Models Predicting Career Satisfaction  
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Variables Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE 
Female 0.516*** (0.153)  0.516*** (0.153)  -1.371* (0.534) 
Age 0.018 (0.018)  0.018 (0.018)  0.015 (0.018) 
Spouse’s age -0.020 (0.018)  -0.020 (0.018)  -0.015 (0.018) 
College graduate  
           (reference: less than college) -0.286 (0.166) 
 
-0.285 (0.166) 
 
-0.380* (0.174) 
Spouse college graduate 
           (reference: less than college) -0.487** (0.167) 
 
-0.487** (0.167) 
 
-0.413* (0.170) 
No. children at home -0.047 (0.084)  -0.047 (0.084)  -0.045 (0.085) 
Professional/manager 
          (reference: other occupation) 0.088 (0.171) 
 
0.087 (0.171) 
 
0.007 (0.175) 
Spouse professional/manager  
          (reference: other occupation) -0.049 (0.169) 
 
-0.049 (0.169) 
 
0.042 (0.172) 
Hours worked/week 0.021* (0.009)  0.020* (0.009)  0.017 (0.010) 
Spouse’s hours worked/week 0.005 (0.009)  0.005 (0.009)  0.008 (0.009) 
Job involvement scale -0.163 (0.146)  -0.164 (0.146)  -0.167 (0.147) 
Health 0.133** (0.051)  0.134** (0.050)  0.126* (0.050) 
Spouse’s health 0.073 (0.048)  0.073 (0.048)  0.082 (0.048) 
Household income 1.038*** (0.275)  1.041*** (0.276)  1.077*** (0.281) 
Gender role ideology scale -0.068 (0.096)  -0.069 (0.097)  -0.075 (0.098) 
Wife’s proportion housework time -0.298 (0.417)  -0.295 (0.417)  -0.303 (0.419) 
Ratio of wives’ earnings to total  
          earnings at wave 1 -0.243 (0.711) 
 
-0.217 (0.727) 
 
-2.592** (0.978) 
Change in earnings ratio from 
Wave  
          1 to Wave 2  ---- ---- 
 
0.176 (1.457) 
 
0.178 (1.475) 
Gender X earnings ratio ---- ----  ---- ----  4.729*** (1.273) 
Constant 
-
13.798*** (3.090) 
 
-
13.839*** (3.097) 
 -
13.248**
* (3.136) 
Pseudo R2 0.049  0.049  0.059 
Note. N = 918.  Models include dummy variables for major employing organizations of 
respondents; coefficients not shown. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of having high career satisfaction by gender and family economic 
form (N = 918). Based on Model 3 reported in Table 3. Assumes respondent and spouse have 
academic education and hold a professional or managerial occupation. All other variables are 
held at their mean.  
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